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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the connectivity of the Spanish airport system between 2001 and 
2007 indirect and direct and indirect services. Over the period, hub carriers considerably 
strengthened the connectivity between Spanish airports and other European hubs. 
Although oneworld is still the dominant alliance in Spain, SkyTeam and Star additional 
connectivity share through the growth of indirect services provided through their northern 
European hubs. In addition, the network rationalization strategy of Iberia and its decision 
to concentrate operations at Madrid-Barajas had important implications for the 
connectivity of other Spanish airports. Low-cost carriers have boosted direct connectivity 
from secondary Spanish airports.  
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1. Introduction 
The Spanish domestic and international aviation markets, the second largest in Europe in 
terms of passengers, witnessed a substantial growths in competition the introduction of 
the Third Package of liberalization measures in 1997. Two main developments stand out. 
The consolidation of low-cost carriers boosted air-service supply involving Spanish 
regional airport and Iberia developed Madrid-Barajas into a key hub for traffic between 
the EU and Latin America, while giving up its secondary operations in Barcelona. 
Against the background of these and other market developments, we focus on 
changes Spanish airport connectivity between 2001 and 2007, defining connectivity as 
the number of direct and indirect connections between two airports, weighted by the 
quality of these connections in terms of transfer time and routing time. Therefore, 
network connectivity analyses respond to the rise and dominance of hub-and-spoke 
networks. Hence, studying airport connectivity hierarchy provides a complement to 
traditional top-ten passenger rankings for illustrating the real position of airports in the 
world-city network.. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
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The Netscan model is used to the measurement of connectivity (Veldhuis, 1997). Netscan 
allows measurement of connectivity from two perspectives. The first takes the point of 
view of the consumer and measures the availability of connections for the passenger 
travelling between an origin airport A and a destination airport B. Such connections can 
be either direct or indirect. For a passenger, the quality of an indirect connection is not 
equal to the quality of a direct connection. In other words, one should take into account 
the connection quality when considering connectivity. Netscan counts the number of 
direct and indirect connections and weighs each connection by its quality in terms of 
transfer and detour time relative to a theoretical direct flight. The second perspective 
takes the point of view of the hub airport and measures the number of possible 
connections with a transfer at a particular hub airport.  
As input for the Netscan model, we use Official Airline Guide (OAG) flight 
schedule data covering the 3rd week of September of 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007. Direct 
flights can be directly derived from OAG, but it does not provide information about 
connections, they are built by means of an algorithm. For each incoming flight at a given 
airport, it identifies the connecting outgoing flights. The algorithm builds the connections 
for flights with a minimum connection time of 45 minutes, a maximum connecting time 
of 760 minutes and a maximum routing factor of 170%.1 Only online, guided 
connections, transfers between flights of the same airline or flights between airlines of the 
same alliance group, are considered as being viable.2  
Netscan attaches a quality index to each direct and indirect connection and scales 
it to the quality of a theoretical direct connection. The index for each connection ranges 
from zero to one, with direct, non-stop connections having the maximum value. The 
index of an indirect connection is always lower than unity because passengers experience 
poorer connection quality due to the transfer time at the hub and the detour time of the 
flight. The same holds for multi-stop connections.3 If the additional travel-time for an 
indirect connection exceeds a given threshold, the quality index of the connection is zero. 
The quality threshold of a specific indirect connection depends on the theoretical direct-
travel time between the two airports; thus the longer this is, the longer the maximum 
indirect travel-time. The geographical coordinates of origin and destination airport and 
assumptions on flight speed and time needed for take-off and landing determine the travel 
time of a theoretical direct connection. In addition, transfer-time has an additional 
penalty, as passengers dislike waiting at hubs. Finally, by taking the product of the 
quality index and the frequency of the connection per week, Netscan calculates the  
number of connections or connectivity units (CNU).  
Over the study period, there were 48 airports in the Spanish system and 41 of 
these are included here; the remainder (Cordoba, Huesca, Madrid-Cuatro Vientos, 
Madrid-Torrejon, Sabadell, Burgos and Son Bonet) had no scheduled service during the                                                         
1 The maximum routing factor is defined as the ratio between in-flight time and potential direct flight time. 
If the detour is excessive the connection is excluded. 
2 Although  “self-help  hubbing”  numbers  have  risen, and in some cases represent an important number of 
passengers, this kind of connection is not taken into account.  
3 A non-stop direct flight is a flight between airport A and airport B. A multi-stop flight is a flight between 
airport A and airport B stopping at C with neither a change of aircraft nor a change of flight number. A 
multi-stop flight with change of gauge is a flight between airport A and airport B stopping at C with a 
change of aircraft, but without a change of flight number. An indirect flight is a flight between airport A 
and airport B stopping at C with a change of aircraft and a change of flight number. 
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period. We distinguish six geographical destination markets – domestic, Europe, North 
America, Latin America, Africa and Asia-Pacific, and for  2005 and 2007, three alliances 
are distinguished (oneworld, SkyTeam and Star) and for 2001 and 2003 Wings is 
incorporated, it was integrated into SkyTeam in 2004. 
 
3. Direct and indirect connectivity 
In 2007, Spanish airports provided over 38,000 CNU to the consumer, half involving 
direct services. Table 1 shows direct and indirect connectivity in 2001 and 2007 by 
airport type.4 On the one hand, direct connectivity increased more at third-, fourth- and 
fifth-tier airports due to the growing number of low-cost operations. On the other hand, 
indirect connectivity increased more at first- and second-tier airports, mainly at Madrid-
Barajas and Barcelona. Palma de Mallorca, although being part of the second category, 
had an important loss in indirect connectivity due to its low-cost specialization. 
[TABLE 1] 
 
For short-haul routes, the attractiveness of an indirect connection for passengers is much 
lower due to long transfer and detour times relative to a theoretical direct flight. As Swan 
(2010) points out, there is a general decrease of the share of direct connections as 
distance increases. In fact, the share indirect connectivity was only 10% for Spanish 
domestic destinations, 37% for European destinations and 92% for intercontinental 
destinations (Table 2).  
[TABLE 2] 
 
Domestic destinations represented the majority of direct connectivity, 60% in 2001 
against 54% in 2007. This decrease was due to the strong growth of connectivity in 
international markets, particularly within European. The relative importance of domestic 
direct connectivity reveals the prominent role of air transport in domestic transport. The 
country’s   geographical   characteristics,   the   distribution   of   the  main   urban   areas   and   the  
lack of an effective long-distance train service, until high-speed rail developments, have 
supported domestic air travel. 
The European market was the fastest growing market between 2001 and 2007 in 
terms of direct connectivity, increasing by 79%. European destinations accounted for 
43% of direct connectivity in 2007 and 25% of indirect connectivity (Table 2); about 
68% of the direct connectivity being provided by low-cost and leisure carriers, and 
carriers not members of an alliance, such as Air Europa.5 Significant growth of low-cost 
and leisure carriers took place between 2005 and 2007 when their connectivity to Europe 
increased by 50%. In 2007, Ryanair, easyJet, Air Berlin, Vueling and Clickair together 
accounted for 33% of the direct connectivity between Spain to the rest of Europe. 
Conversely, connectivity of major network carriers dropped, for example, Iberia reduced 
its direct connectivity by 11% and Air France by 6%,.6                                                          
4 Here we follow the classification established of Suau-Sanchez and Burghouwt (2011). Using numbers of 
passengers in 2008 allows the 41 Spanish airports to be classified into five groups by using the natural 
breaks  method  and  Jenks’  optimization  (Jenks,  1967). 
5 Air Europa did not join SkyTeam until the end of September 2007. 
6 If we measure competition at the route level using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) we find that, 
although flagship carriers have been rationalizing their networks to meet competition from LCCs, the 
average level of competition at the route level increased between 2005 and 2007. While  Iberia’s  routes  to  
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Intercontinental markets 
In 2007, intercontinental destinations represented only 3% of direct connectivity, but 
69% of indirect connectivity; the most important intercontinental markets being North 
American and Latin America, which accounted for 40% and 31%. During the period, 
Latin America exchanged its position of being the best-connected intercontinental market 
with North America; direct and indirect connectivity to the North American market 
increased 26% and 23%, whereas direct and indirect connectivity to Latin America 
decreased      by   14%   and   16%.   Three   reasons   for   the   change   can   be   identified.   Iberia’s  
network rationalization strategy caused a major drop of connectivity to the Latin 
American market between 2003 and 2005, which was partly recovered in 2005 to 2007. 
Second, the network expansion of US network carriers resulted in more direct 
connections to US hubs and, hence, a sharp growth of indirect connections via them. 
Third, the quality of the network developed by US carriers is superior to that of South 
American airlines. In 2001, each direct connection to North America from Spanish 
airports generated 19.6 indirect CNU via North American and by 2007, this number had 
risen to 20.1 CNU. In contrast, the number of indirect connections generated at Latin 
American hubs per direct flight from Spain to Latin America was 1.7 CNU in 2001 and 
1.5 CNU in 2007.7 
The two intercontinental markets with the lowest level of direct connectivity were 
Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. The former accounted for less than 2% of 
intercontinental direct connectivity, and the latter for 10%. Despite third, Asia-Pacific 
ranks as the third largest intercontinental market, thanks to indirect connections. 
European hubs generated 93% of the indirect connectivity to the Asia-Pacific region, 
with London-Heathrow, Paris-CDG and Frankfurt-Main providing 64% of the indirect 
connectivity.  
 
Alliances: the shapers of accessibility 
Oneworld, with Iberia as its Spanish airline, is the dominant alliance in Spain; in 2007 it 
accounted for 40% of connectivity, 33% direct and 46% indirect (Table 3), with Iberian 
having 46% and 88% shares of this. In 2007, 19 of the 41 airports got more than the 50% 
of their connectivity from Iberia, and 31 airports for indirect connectivity.  
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Although OneWorld and its hub at Madrid-Barajas dominates the provision of 
connectivity between Spanish airports and intercontinental destinations, other alliances 
and foreign hubs play an important role in shaping accessibility between Spain and the 
rest of the world (Figure 1). Madrid-Barajas and Barcelona stand out as the airports with 
the greatest level of connectivity; in both cases, more than 75% of their connectivity to                                                                                                                                                                      
European destinations had an average HHI of 0.61 in 2005, in 2007 it was 0.57. The effects of increasing 
competition is even more noticeable on the routes served by Air France; in 2005 the HHI was 0.73, in 2007 
it was 0.64. 
7 Lipovich (2009) identifies hubs how the network is designed in terms of destinations, the excessive 
minimum connecting times; and large number of connections requiring a visa as the main reasons for the 
poor performance of Latin American. 
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intercontinental destinations was provided by foreign hubs. The rest of the airports show 
very modest numbers, because their intercontinental connectivity is mainly dependent on 
supply feeding services of Iberia and Air Nostrum in Madrid-Barajas. Even Palma de 
Mallorca, the third largest Spanish airport in terms of passengers and well connected to 
Germany (641 direct CNU) and to the rest of Spain (640.2 direct CNU) showed low 
intercontinental connectivity because its traffic is mainly low-cost and leisure related. 
For some Spanish airports, however, indirect connectivity through European hubs 
has become a way of significantly increasing their overall connectivity level, this, for 
example is the cases regarding Vigo, Bilbao and Málaga. Vigo and Bilbao are the best 
examples. In the case of Vigo, 75% connectivity was provided by indirect flights and of 
this, 59% was indirect connectivity provided by Air France through Paris-CDG. Bilbao is 
a similar case; 70% of the total connectivity was provided by indirect flights; of this, 33% 
was provided through Paris-CDG, 17% via Frankfurt-Main and 14% via Milan-
Malpensa. These cases are not only show that being connected to major hubs increases 
the level of connectivity and provides access to a wider market, but also the importance 
of non-Spanish carriers shaping the accessibility patterns at Spanish airports.  
 
 [FIGURE 1] 
 
Oneworld lost part of its market position to SkyTeam and Star. Between 2001 and 
2007 oneorld lost, in general terms 1% of its connectivity, while SkyTeam increased its 
connectivity by 133% and Star by 319%, althoiug both SkyTeam and Star started from a 
low base. In the case of SkyTeam, part of the growth was the result of the integration of 
Wings into SkyTeam in September 2004. In the case of Star, an important share of the 
growth was due to the entry of Spanair into the alliance in 2003. The growing importance 
of SkyTeam and Star in the Spanish market has not only been achieved by integrating 
new partners, but also from improving their feeding networks from Spanish airports to 
their hubs. In fact, of the top ten hubs with large increases in indirect connectivity from 
Spanish airports to the rest of the world between 2001 and 2007, five belong to Star 
(Frankfurt-Main, Munich, Philadelphia, Lisbon and Vienna), four to SkyTeam (Paris-
CDG, New York-Newark, Milan-Malpensa and Amsterdam) and only one to OneWorld 
(Madrid-Barajas). 
The case of Paris-CDG demonstrates the changing balance of alliances providing 
indirect connectivity to Spanish airports. Since Iberia is part of OneWorld, one would 
expect that the non-Spanish European hub providing most indirect CNU would be 
London-Heathrow. This was, indeed, the case in 2001, but Paris-CDG became the most 
important onward hub for Spanish airports by 2007. Between 2001 and 2007, indirect 
connectivity provided by Air France via Paris-CDG from Spanish airports to the rest of 
the world increased by 76%; with Madrid-Barajas, Barcelona, Bilbao and Vigo feeding 
Air France’s   Paris   hub.   These   developments   were   related   to   the   changes   in   the   feed  
structure of Air France; after it merged with KLM in 2004 it intensified its operations 
involving southern European countries. 
 
4. The hub airport perspective: hub connectivity 
Table 4 shows hub connectivity, broken down by alliances, at Madrid-Barajas, Barcelona 
and Palma de Mallorca, the Spanish airports with substantial amounts of hub 
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connectivity. First, oneworld and Iberia dominated the hub market, with a share of 87% 
and 75% of hub connectivity via these airports. Second, the hub role of Barcelona 
disappeared.  These  chnages  show  the  importance  of   Iberia’s  decisions  in  relation  to   the  
competitive position of the Spanish airports.  
 
 [TABLE 4] 
 
Iberia, from multi-hub to single hub 
Iberia has been restructuring and rationalizing its network for a time. In 1996, it 
implemented a four wave-system structure for its hub at Madrid-Barajas and a three 
wave-system at Barcelona (Figure 2). The lack of capacity at the airports, however, did 
not allow for the improvement of the wave-system at either. However, in February 2006, 
Madrid-Barajas opened the new Terminal 4 and its Satellite Terminal together with two 
new runways. This gave Iberia the opportunity to restructure its network. 
The first step  in  the  rationalization  of  Iberia’s  network  involved  the  de-hubbing of 
its Miami extra-territorial hub in 2004, but this cannot be directly attributed to its  
concentration strategy on Madrid-Barajas. The implementation of new US security 
regulations stipulation that foreign travelers needed to obtain US visas even if they were 
merely passing through American airports to catch a connecting flight to another country 
hit   the   airline’s   business   (Burghouwt,   2007). Nevertheless, since Miami is one of the 
hubs  of   Iberia’s  partner,  American  Airlines,   it   remains  an   important  gateway   to   the  US  
and Latin America for the Spanish consumer. 
The second base dismantled by Iberia was its secondary hub in Barcelona. The 
coupling of operations with the main hub at Madrid-Barajas and the Puente Aéreo (the air 
shuttle  between  Madrid  and  Barcelona)  operations  made  Barcelona’s  hub  dependent  on  
Madrid-Barajas’   wave-system structure.  This, however produced an inconvenient 
situation in which the first bank of departing flights was at 9:30 am that did not match the 
demand of the incoming-outgoing business market.  
Between 2004 and 2008 Iberia withdrew 5.6 million seats from Barcelona, 
785,000 of them to intercontinental destinations, representing 69% of its intercontinental 
seat capacity at the airport (Suau-Sanchez and Burghouwt, 2011).8 It also dismantled the 
wave-system   at   the   airport.   As   a   result,   oneworld’s   hub   connectivity   at   Barcelona   fell  
69% from 2003 to 2007 (Table 4). The end of hub operations in Barcelona should be 
understood in the context that concentrating of operations at one hub is generally more 
profitable than its dispersion over two hubs in close proximity (Burghouwt and de Wit, 
2005)9 
Nonetheless, most of the intercontinental flights served by Iberia from Barcelona 
were multi-stop flights via Madrid-Barajas, that in most of the cases also involved a                                                         
8 To avoid losing its market position at Barcelona in short-haul markets, Iberia set up the low-cost 
subsidiary Clickair in 2007, which provided 3.3 million seats to domestic, European and North African 
destinations from Barcelona. Clickair merged in 2009 with Vueling, and the resulting carrier maintained 
the name of Vueling and started to operate in June, 2009. Forty-five percent of the shares of the new 
Vueling are owned by Iberia. 
9 Iberia’s  network  restructuring is not unique. Since 2000, for example, British Airways de-hubbed London 
Gatwick and Air France ceased hub operations at Clermont-Ferrand after taking over Regional Airlines. 
Dual-hub networks can result in profitability problems for airlines if services are duplicated and 
coordinating two hubs poses financially and operationally challenges.  
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change of gauge (Suau-Sanchez  and  Burghouwt,  2011).  In  fact,  in  2003,  of  Iberia’s  168  
direct intercontinental flights taking off from Barcelona in the week studies, only 18 were 
non-stop, the rest were multi-stops, although marketed as direct flights.  
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
The efforts of the airline to intensify its hub activity at Madrid-Barajas by 
improving its wave-system   structure   increased   oneworld’s   hub   connectivity   by   18% 
between 2005 and 2007. The restructuring policy was framed in the Iberia Master Plan 
2006-2008 (Iberia, 2006) that aimed to optimize the network structure by decreasing the 
number of destinations, increasing frequencies, and improving aircraft utilization. In 
addition, the aim was to decrease domestic capacity while increasing the intercontinental 
market shares focusing on the Madrid-Barajas hub to Latin America as well as feeder 
services. The Master Plan had a positive impact on the connectivity level to Latin 
America, with the connectivity increasing by 22%, from 2005 to 2007.  
 
Hub  connectivity:  the  implications  of  Iberia’s  rationalization  for  the  consumer 
Overall,  the  larger  role  of  Iberia’s  hub  at  Madrid-Barajas provided more possibilities for 
consumers to access intercontinental destinations. From 2005 to 2007, direct 
intercontinental connectivity increased by 14%10 and by 2007, 50% of the airline’s  direct 
intercontinental connectivity was to Latin American destinations. 
The strategy of Iberia at Madrid-Barajas affected direct and indirect connectivity 
levels over the rest of the Spanish airports (Figure 3). On the one hand, those airports 
connected with Madrid-Barajas increased their indirect connectivity because for each 
Iberia flight arriving at Madrid-Barajas there are more onward flights to connect with. On 
the other hand, those airports not well served by Iberia lost the possibility of benefiting 
from the growth at Madrid-Barajas. In particular, the airports where Iberia reduced 
services are those in which the airline was suffering increasing competition from low-cost 
carriers and the development of high-speed   train   services   adversely   affected   Iberia’s  
connectivity in Seville, Zaragoza and Malaga. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
5. Conclusions 
We have measured the connectivity level of the Spanish airport system looking both at 
direct  and  indirect  connectivity  the  consumer’s  perspective  and  at  hub  connectivity    as  it  
affects   the   performance   of   airports’   hub   operations.   In   the   former   case,   the   share   of  
domestic connectivity is quite high showing the good level of connection within the 
domestic market. For Europe, the growth of direct connectivity by low-cost carriers has 
been the leading trend, together with a decrease of direct services by network carriers. 
Regarding intercontinental destinations, North America and Latin America are well 
covered from Spain because of the dominance of Iberia and oneworld. For other markets, 
such as Asia-Pacific, the Spanish consumer is almost fully dependent on indirect 
connectivity through non-Spanish hubs showing the importance these hubs have in 
generating additional accessibility for consumers. The analysis of hub connectivity 
centered on the rationalization of the network of Iberia. This had a positive impact on                                                         
10 On  the  other  hand,  Iberia’s  direct  domestic  and  European  connectivity  decreased  by  1%  and  11%. 
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airports connected to Madrid-Barajas, but a negative influence on those airports that were 
excluded in the rationalization. In the case of Barcelona, although hub connectivity 
values collapsed, this did not have a significant impact on overall connectivity because 
the airport is well connected to major European hubs. 
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Table 1 Direct and indirect connectivity in 2001 and 2007 by airport tier.  
 
    2001 2007 ∆ 2001-2008 
Group Airport Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Total 
         
First-tier              
 Madrid-Barajas 3,857.0 4,738.5 4,626.1 5,998.3 19.9% 26.6% 23.6% 
Second-tier              
 Barcelona 2,605.5 3,691.3 3,356.0 5,054.8 28.8% 36.9% 33.6% 
 
Palma de 
Mallorca 1,209.1 628.4 1,839.0 425.9 52.1% -32.2% 23.3% 
 Subtotal 3,814.6 4,319.7 5,195.0 5,480.7 36.2% 26.9% 31.2% 
Third-tier              
 Málaga 625.1 948.5 1,182.5 742.7 89.1% -21.7% 22.3% 
 Las Palmas 575.5 478.2 794.1 527.4 38.0% 10.3% 25.4% 
 Alicante 355.0 331.5 742.0 294.9 109.0% -11.0% 51.0% 
 Tenerife South 201.2 178.0 287.2 168.7 42.8% -5.2% 20.3% 
 Subtotal 1,756.8 1,936.1 3,005.8 1,733.7 71.1% -10.5% 28.3% 
Fourth-tier              
 All (11 airports) 2,643.3 3,139.3 4,432.4 3,352.4 67.7% 6.8% 34.6% 
Fifth-tier              
 All (23 airports) 1,112.5 1,858.4 1,890.6 2,569.4 69.9% 38.3% 50.1% 
         
Total   13,184.2 15,992.1 19,149.9 19,134.5 45.2% 19.6% 31.2% 
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Table 2 Connectivity at Spanish airports by destination market.  
 
Destination 
market 2001 
 
2003 
 
2005 2007 
 Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Europe (without 
domestic) 4,607.6 3,431.7 5,221.5 3,641.3 6,173.0 4,303.3 8,226.1 4,845.0 
Domestic 7,886.4 1,227.8 7,567.9 995.1 8,750.6 1,034.2 10,238.3 1,194.7 
North America 111.0 4,356.3 116.6 4,716.0 104.5 4,942.8 140.1 5,353.6 
Latin America 315.8 4,635.3 307.5 4,158.5 243.0 3,253.1 272.6 3,930.2 
Asia-Pacific 7.9 1,317.8 8.1 1,429.8 12.2 1,957.1 11.2 2,350.7 
Africa 208.1 490.1 152.4 602.7 166.0 666.7 194.0 755.1 
Middle East 47.4 533.2 48.7 463.8 56.2 619.7 67.5 705.0 
 
Total 13,184.1 15,992.1 13,422.7 16,007.1 15,505.5 16,776.9 19,149.8 19,134.5 
 
 
 
Table 3 Connectivity at Spanish airports by alliance.  
 
Alliance 2001 2003 2005 2007 
 Direct Indirect  Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
 
SkyTeam 338.3 2,199.7 352.2 2,630.2 606.2 4,611.0 651.9 5,275.0 
Star 327.6 1,338.8 1,576.4 2,199.7 2,105.7 3,217.1 2,816.2 4,162.5 
OneWorld 5,962.5 9,394.6 6,088.4 9,228.9 6,484.5 8,154.7 6,343.2 8,876.4 
Wings 217.9 1,128.2 224.8 1,030.8 - - - - 
Non-
network 
carriers 6,337.8 1,930.8 5,180.9 917.5 6,309.0 793.8 9,338.6 820.6 
 
Total 13,184.2 15,992.1 13,422.7 16,007.1 15,505.5 16,776.9 19,149.9 19,134.5 
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Table 4. Hub connectivity at Madrid-Barajas, Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca.  
 
 
Alliance 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
  CNU % CNU % CNU % CNU % 
M
ad
rid
-B
ar
aj
as
 OneWorld 15,139.8 93.2 14,882.4 94.5 13,933.4 91.7 16,919.6 91.0 
SkyTeam 93.4 0.6 67.8 0.4 185.4 1.2 233.5 1.3 
Star 4.0 0.0 578.2 3.7 767.2 5.1 1,016.2 5.5 
Wings 21.4 0.1 21.6 0.1 - - - - 
Others 982.1 6.0 203.7 1.3 302.8 2.0 419.1 2.3 
Total 16,240.7 100 15,753.7 100 15,188.8 100 18,588.3 100 
B
ar
ce
lo
na
 
OneWorld 3,208.2 97.6 3,701.3 95.0 1,838.1 80.3 1,144.9 62.2 
SkyTeam 36.9 1.1 34.8 0.9 63.9 2.8 91.4 5.0 
Star -  152.9 3.9 369.5 16.1 589.0 32.0 
Wings - - 2.4 0.1 - - - - 
Others 42.6 1.3 6.6 0.2 18.1 0.8 16.6 0.9 
Total 3,287.6 100 3,898.0 100 2,289.7 100 1,841.9 100 
Pa
lm
a 
de
 M
al
lo
rc
a 
OneWorld 5.4 66.1 2.9 2.6 6.3 1.7 7.4 1.7 
SkyTeam - - - - - - - - 
Star - - 2.8 - 3.8 1.0 9.8 2.3 
Wings - - - - - - - - 
Air Berlin - - 103.3 - 369.3 97.3 411.4 96.0 
Others 2.8 33.9 1.7 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Total 8.1 100 110.6 100 379.5 100 428.7 100 
12  
 
 
FIGURE 1. Connectivity to intercontinental destinations, share of national and foreign 
hubs in indirect connectivity, and direct connectivity, 2007.  
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FIGURE 2. Wave-system structure of Iberia at Barcelona (2003, 2007) 
 
14  
 
 
FIGURE 3. Connectivity growth of Iberia by airport (2001 to 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
